How Have the Texts Been Modified?
The texts are not dumbed down. Where a change is made, it is to make the original thought more accessible than it is on the original page. In no case have I knowingly simplified or otherwise altered the intellectual content. The changes have mainly consisted in one or more of the following:
- basic updating of language - show/hide examples
Locke wrote:
If, by this enquiry into the nature of the understanding, I can discover the powers thereof; how far they reach; to what things they are in any degree proportionate; and where they fail us: I suppose it may be of use to prevail with the busy mind of man, to be more cautious in meddling with things exceeding its comprehension; to stop when it is at the utmost extent of its tether; and to sit down in a quiet ignorance of those things which, upon examination, are found to be beyond the reach of our capacities. We should not then perhaps be so forward, out of an affectation of an universal knowledge, to raise questions, and perplex ourselves and others with disputes about things, to which our understandings are not suited; and of which we cannot frame in our minds any clear or distinct perceptions, or whereof (as it has perhaps too often happened) we have not any notions at all. If we can find out how far the understanding can extend its view, how far it has faculties to attain certainty, and in what cases it can only judge and guess; we may learn to content ourselves with what is attainable by us in this state.
Modified version:
I hope that this enquiry into the nature of the understanding will enable me to discover what its powers are - how far they reach, what things they are adequate to deal with, and where they fail us. If I succeed, that may have the effect of persuading the busy mind of man to be more cautious in concerning itself with things that are beyond its powers to understand; to stop when it is at the extreme end of its tether; and to be peacefully reconciled to ignorance of things which turn out to be beyond the reach of our capacities. Perhaps then we shall stop pretending that we know everything, and shall not be so bold in raising questions and getting into confusing disputes with others about things to which our understandings are not suited - things of which we cannot form any clear or distinct perceptions in our minds, or, as happens all too often, things of which we have no notions at all. If we can find out what the scope of the understanding is, how far it is able to achieve certainty, and in what cases it can only judge and guess, that may teach us to accept our limitations and to rest content with knowing only what our human condition enables us to know.
Hobbes wrote:
. . . as all sorts of manufacture, so also malice increaseth by being vendible.
Modified version:
. . . malice, like everything else made by men, increases when there is a market for it.
- less convoluted syntax and shorter sentences - show/hide examples
A single sentence, translating a single sentence by Kant:
To approach a new science - one that is entirely isolated and is the only one of its kind - with the prejudice that it can be judged by means of one’s putative cognitions already otherwise obtained, even though it is precisely the reality of those that must first be completely called into question, results only in believing that one sees everywhere something that was already otherwise known, because the expressions perhaps sound similar; except that everything must seem to be extremely deformed, contradictory, and nonsensical, because one does not thereby make the author’s thoughts fundamental, but always simply one’s own, made natural through long habit.
Modified version:
Suppose we are confronted by a new science that is wholly isolated and the only one of its kind. If we start with the assumption that we can make judgments about it in terms of knowledge that we have already gained - which is precisely what has first to be called in question ·when considering a new science· - all we shall achieve is to see everywhere things we already know, with the words sounding familiar but everything seeming (·so far as the content is concerned·) to be pushed out of shape, senseless, gibberish. That is because we’ll be relying on our own notions, which long habit has made second nature for us, instead of relying on the author’s.
A sentence by Hobbes:
And though this may seem too subtle a deduction of the laws of nature, to be taken notice of by all men; whereof the most part are too busy in getting food, and the rest too negligent to understand; yet to leave all men inexcusable, they have been contracted into one easy sum, intelligible, even to the meanest capacity; and that is, Do not that to another, which thou wouldest not have done to thyself; which sheweth him, that he has no more to do in learning the laws of nature, but, when weighing the actions of other men with his own, they seem too heavy, to put them into the other part of the balance, and his own into their place, that his own passions, and self-love, may add nothing to the weight; and then there is none of these laws of nature that will not appear unto him very reasonable.
Modified version:
This ·chapter· may seem too subtle a deduction of the laws of nature to be attended to by all men, most of whom are too busy getting food to understand it, and the rest are too careless to do so. However, these laws of nature have been contracted into one easy sum that can be grasped even by the poorest intelligence, namely: Don’t do to someone else anything that you wouldn’t want done to you. That shows a man that in learning the laws of nature all he has to do is this: When weighing the actions of other men against his own, if they seem too heavy then he should put them into the other pan of the balance, and his own into their pan, to ensure that his own passions and self-love are not adding anything to the weight. If he does that, all of these laws of nature that will appear to him very reasonable. ·Because this procedure is available·, he cannot excuse himself ·for not knowing the laws of nature on the ground that they are too complicated and difficult·.
A single sentence by Locke:
The state of war is a state of enmity and destruction: and therefore declaring by word or action, not a passionate and hasty, but a sedate settled design upon another man’s life, puts him in a state of war with him against whom he has declared such an intention, and so has exposed his life to the other’s power to be taken away by him, or any one that joins with him in his defence, and espouses his quarrel; it being reasonable and just, I should have a right to destroy that which threatens me with destruction: for, by the fundamental law of nature, man being to be preserved as much as possible, when all cannot be preserved, the safety of the innocent is to be preferred: and one may destroy a man who makes war upon him, or has discovered an enmity to his being, for the same reason that he may kill a wolf or a lion; because such men are not under the ties of the common law of reason, have no other rule, but that of force and violence, and so may be treated as beasts of prey, those dangerous and noxious creatures, that will be sure to destroy him whenever he falls into their power.
Modified version:
The state of war is a state of enmity and destruction. So when someone declares by word or action - not in a sudden outburst of rage, but as a matter of calm settled design - that he intends to end another man’s life, he puts himself into a state of war against the other person; and he thereby exposes his life to the risk of falling to the power of the •other person or anyone that joins with •him in his defence and takes up his quarrel. For it is reasonable and just that I should have a right to destroy anything that threatens me with destruction, because the fundamental law of nature says that men are to be preserved as much as possible, and that when not everyone can be preserved the safety of the innocent is to be preferred. ·In line with this·, I may destroy a man who makes war on me or has revealed himself as an enemy to my life, for the same reason that I may kill a wolf or a lion; because such men are not under the ties of the common law of reason, have no rule except that of force and violence, and so may be treated as beasts of prey - dangerous creatures that will certainly destroy me if I fall into their power.
- numbering of points
- indenting of passages that are helped by such a display
- replacement of obsolete words with current ones
- replacement of still-current words used in meanings that are now obsolete - show/hide examples
Many words that are still current in English have lost meanings that they had in the 16th-18th centuries - more, indeed, than is generally recognized. A recent good edition of Berkeley’s Principles includes a glossary, but it attends only to words that are now obsolete, ignoring current ones with obsolete meanings. Its editor has agreed with me that he was wrong to omit from his glossary the following:
allege, amuse, attend, collect, described, detract, discover, evidence, harsh, ideal, image, induction, parcel, philosopher, presently, pretend, proper, received, repugnant, schools, strangely, suffer
all of which are used by Berkeley in senses very different from their current ones.
For example, he writes of ‘labyrinths of amusement’, meaning ‘labyrinths of baffled confusion’. He and others frequently use
‘pretend’ to mean ‘claim’,
‘repugnant to’ to mean ‘contradictory to’
‘discover’ to mean ‘reveal [in oneself]’
‘conscience’ to mean ‘consciousness’
and so on.
- I sometimes insert, between small ·dots·, material that makes the author’s meaning clearer or more explicit - show/hide example
Hume’s text:
All sceptics pretend, that, if reason be considered in an abstract view, it furnishes invincible arguments against itself; and that we could never retain any conviction or assurance, on any subject, were not the sceptical reasonings so refined and subtile, that they are not able to counterpoise the more solid and more natural arguments derived from the senses and experience. But it is evident, whenever our arguments lose this advantage, and run wide of common life, that the most refined scepticism comes to be upon a footing with them, and is able to oppose and counterbalance them.
Amended text:
All sceptics claim that if reason is considered abstractly, it provides invincible arguments against itself, and that we could never retain any opinion or confidence on any subject if it were not that the sceptical reasonings ·in which reason discredits itself· are so refined and subtle that they cannot outweigh the more solid and more natural arguments derived from the senses and experience. But it is obvious that when our arguments lose this advantage ·of solidity and naturalness·, and run wide of everyday life, the most refined scepticism comes to be on an equal footing with them and can oppose and counterbalance them.
- I use •bullets to make formal aspects of the text more easily accessible - show/hide example
An example from Kant:
If you also find this too obscure - this plan which I offer as the Prolegomena to any future Metaphysics - bear in mind •that it’s not necessary for everyone to study metaphysics, •that many people have the aptitude to succeed very well in sciences (even deep ones) that are closer to sense-experience, yet cannot succeed in investigations dealing with highly abstract concepts, •that such people should employ their talents on other subjects; •that someone who undertakes to make judgments in metaphysics - let alone to construct a metaphysical system - must satisfy the demands I have made here, which he cannot do by rejecting them, so he must either adopt my solution or thoroughly refute it and put another in its place; and, finally, •that this notorious obscurity (·allegations of which are· often a cloak to cover the accuser’s laziness or stupidity) also has its uses ·as a defence against insolent intruders·: people who maintain a cautious silence in relation to other sciences approach metaphysics in a spirit of bold pronouncements and impudent decisions, because their ignorance is not here contrasted with the knowledge of others.
- Sometimes I omit a passage that doesn’t earn its keep, signifying this by . . . . a four-point ellipsis, just to keep things moving along at a good pace - show/hide examples
Hume wrote:
It is certain a man of solid sense and long experience ought to have, and usually has, a greater assurance in his opinions than one that is foolish and ignorant, and that our sentiments have different degrees of authority, even with ourselves, in proportion to the degrees of our reason and experience. In the man of the best sense and longest experience, this authority is never entire; since even such a one must be conscious of many errors in the past, and must still dread the like for the future.
With an omission:
A man of solid sense and long experience certainly should and usually does have more confidence in his opinions than a man who is foolish and ignorant. . . . But even in someone with the best sense and longest experience this confidence is never complete, because such a person must be conscious of many errors in the past, and must still fear making more.
Spinoza wrote:
D2: I say that we act when something happens, in us or outside us, of which we are the adequate cause, i.e. (by D1), when something in us or outside us follows from our nature, which can be clearly and distinctly understood through it alone. On the other hand, I say that we are acted on when something happens in us, or something follows from our nature, of which we are only a partial cause.
With an omission:
D2: I say that we ‘act’ when something happens, in us or outside us, of which we are the adequate cause - that is (by D1) when something happens that follows from our nature, and can be clearly and distinctly understood through it alone. On the other hand, I say that we are ‘acted on’ when something happens in us . . . . of which we are only a partial cause.
Hobbes wrote:
The form of speech whereby men signify their opinion of the goodness of any thing, is PRAISE. That whereby they signify the power and greatness of any thing, is MAGNIFYING. And that whereby they signify the opinion they have of a man's felicity, is by the Greeks called {makarismos}, for which we have no name in our tongue. And thus much is sufficient for the present purpose, to have been said of the PASSIONS.
With an omission:
The form of speech through which men signify their belief in something’s goodness is PRAISE. The form through which they signify something’s power and greatness is MAGNIFYING. . . . And for present purposes that is enough about the PASSIONS.
- On a few occasions I relocate part of one paragraph in the following paragraph, where it is more at home. - show/hide example
Hobbes wrote:
If a covenant be made, wherein neither of the parties perform presently, but trust one another; in the condition of mere nature, (which is a condition of war of every man against every man,) upon any reasonable suspicion, it is void: *but if there be a common power set over them both, with right and force sufficient to compel performance, it is not void*. For he that performeth first, has no assurance the other will perform after; because the bonds of words are too weak to bridle men’s ambition, avarice, anger, and other passions, without the fear of some coercive power; which in the condition of mere nature, where all men are equal, and judges of the justness of their own fears, cannot possibly be supposed. And therefore he which performeth first, does but betray himself to his enemy; contrary to the right (he can never abandon) of defending his life, and means of living.
But in a civil estate, where there is a power set up to constrain those that would otherwise violate their faith, that fear is no more reasonable; and for that cause, he which by the covenant is to perform first, is obliged so to do.
With a relocation of the asterisk-tagged passage in the first paragraph:
What if a covenant is made in which the parties do not perform now, but trust one another ·to perform at an appropriate time in the future·? •If this happens in the condition of mere nature (which is war of every man against every man), the contract is void if one of the parties has a reasonable suspicion ·that the other is not going to perform·. For the one who performs first has no assurance that the other will perform later, because the bonds of words are too weak to rein in men’s ambition, greed, anger, and other passions - unless there is something to be feared from some coercive power; and in the condition of mere nature, where all men are equal and are judges of the reasonableness of their own fears, there can’t possibly be such a power. So he who performs first merely betrays himself to his enemy, which is contrary to his right (which he can never abandon) to defend his life and his means of living.
On the other hand, •if there is a common power set over both parties to the contract, with right and force sufficient to compel performance, the contract is not made void ·by the suspicions of either party to it·. When there is a power set up to constrain those who would otherwise violate their faith, that fear - ·namely, the suspicion that the other party will not perform· - is no longer reasonable; so he who has covenanted to perform first is obliged to do so.
- Sometimes I interpose a remark or explanation of my own in small type within [square brackets] - show/hide examples
‘Just as it is self-contradictory to think of highlands in a world where there are no lowlands, so it is self-contradictory to think of God as not existing---that is, to think of a supremely perfect being as lacking a perfection, namely the perfection of existence.’ [What Descartes wrote is usually translated as ‘mountains in a world where there are no valleys’, but that is obviously not self-contradictory. The Latin provides no escape from this, but Descartes may have been thinking in French, in which vallée can mean ‘valley’ in our sense but can be used to refer to foothills, the lower slopes of a mountain, or the plain immediately surrounding the mountain. So ‘highlands’/‘lowlands’ has been adopted as a compromise: fairly close to what was presumably meant, without being too long-winded.]
* * * * *
But the philosophy schools through all the universities of the Christian world, on the basis of certain texts of Aristotle’s, teach a different doctrine. For the cause of vision they say that the thing that is seen sends out in all directions a visible species, and that seeing the object is receiving this visible species into the eye. (In English, a ‘visible species’ is a visible show, apparition, or aspect, or being-seen.) [Hobbes includes ‘being-seen’ on the strength of the fact that several dominant senses of the Latin species involve seeing. Other senses don’t, but Hobbes’s reason for his choice will appear in a moment.] And for the cause of hearing they say that the thing that is heard sends forth an audible species (that is, an audible aspect, or audible being-seen) which enters the ear and creates hearing. Indeed, for the cause of understanding they say that the thing that is understood sends out intelligible species, that is, an intelligible being-seen, which comes into the understanding and makes us understand! I don’t say this in criticism of universities; I shall come later to the topic of their role in a commonwealth. But on the way to that I must take every opportunity to let you see what things would be amended in them ·if they played their proper role properly·; and one of these is the frequency of meaningless speech.
- Sometimes I replace a passage in the original text by a briefer and/or clearer description of its main content. These replacements are in normal-sized type and within [square brackets] - show/hide example
Adam Smith’s text:
Lewis XIV. during the greater part of his reign, was regarded, not only in France, but over all Europe, as the most perfect model of a great prince. But what were the talents and virtues by which he acquired this great reputation? Was it by the scrupulous and inflexible justice of all his undertakings, by the immense dangers and difficulties with which they were attended, or by the unwearied and unrelenting application with which he pursued them? Was it by his extensive knowledge, by his exquisite judgment, or by his heroic valour? It was by none of these qualities. But he was, first of all, the most powerful prince in Europe, and consequently held the highest rank among kings; and says his historian, ‘he surpassed all his courtiers in the gracefulness of his shape, and the majestic beauty of his features. The sound of his voice, noble and affecting, gained those hearts which his presence intimidated. He had a step and a deportment which could suit only him and his rank, and which would have been ridiculous in any other person. The embarrassment which he occasioned to those who spoke to him, flattered that secret satisfaction with which he felt his own superiority. The old officer, who was confounded and faultered in asking him a favour, and not being able to conclude his discourse, said to him: “Sir, your majesty, I hope, will believe that I do not tremble thus before your enemies” had no difficulty to obtain what he demanded.’ These frivolous accomplishments [etc.]
Amended text:
During most of his reign Louis XIV was widely regarded as the most perfect model of a great prince. What were the talents and virtues by which he acquired this great reputation? The scrupulous and inflexible rightness - the danger and difficulty - the tireless energy - of everything he did? His broad knowledge, his exquisite judgment, his heroic valour? It was none of these. What he did have was the status of the most powerful prince in Europe, which gave him the highest rank among kings; and then, says his historian . . . [and Smith gives a long quotation about Louis XIV’s grand and imposing personal manner, his fine voice, his handsomeness, and so on. Then:] These trivial accomplishments [etc.]
The significances of the indentations, dots, bullets, brackets, and ellipses are explained at the start of each text.
--- JFB